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    1 Introduction
I would support [19th century-style unlimited immigration] if we lived in the 19th
century world where government spending was tiny. But governments now spend
huge amounts on medical care, retirement, education, and other benets and en-
titlements.
{ Gary S. Becker, in \Sell the Right to Immigrate" (2005).
Immigration, particularly the inow of low-skilled individuals, often causes concern that
immigrants with low earning potential could become a heavy burden on the social welfare
system.1 Public education, as an important redistribution mechanism designed to facilitate
social mobility for future generations, cannot but be part of the immigration debate. On the
supply side, immigrant workers contribute to tax revenues that can be used to nance public
schooling in the destination country. Yet on the demand side, children of immigrants generally
have equal access to the public resources embodied in public schooling.2 The aim of this paper
is to study the impact of low-skilled immigrants, through their supply of taxes and demand for
public education, on the education system of the destination country. By education system,
The authors gratefully acknowledge nancial support from the Belgian Federal Government (PAI grant
P6/07, \Economic Policy and Finance in the Global Economy: Equilibrium Analysis and Social Evaluation"),
from the Belgian French-speaking community (Grant ARC 03/08-302 \New Macroeconomic Approaches to
the Development Problem"), and from the European Commission (Marie Curie Research Training Network
\Transnationality of Migrants"). We thank David de la Croix, Fr ed eric Docquier, Matthias Doepke, Giovanni
Facchini and two anonymous referees for many insightful and valuable comments. Scientic feedbacks and
technical suggestions are highly appreciated from Fernanda Estevan, Silvio H.T. Tai, Alfonso Valdesogo, as
well as from the participants in the Warsaw International Economic Meeting 2007, the 11th IZA Summer
School, Germany, the Second Matagne Doctoral Workshop, Belgium, the 23rd Annual Congress of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, the 13th Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional
Economics, and seminar participants at the Universit e catholique de Louvain, the Universit e de Gen eve, and
the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies. All remaining errors are of course ours. The scientic
responsibility is assumed by the authors.
1Facchini and Mayda (2009) nd that, in countries where citizens are, on average, more highly skilled than
immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, after controlling for
education. This is consistent with the authors' theoretical conjecture that wealthier citizens in a welfare state
are concerned by the potentially increasing scale of income redistribution due to the arrival of immigrants.
2For instance, California's 1994 Proposition 187 (ballot initiative to limit the access of immigrants to
public education, which was passed by a narrow majority) was declared unconstitutional by federal judge
Mariana Pfaelzer in a March 1998 ruling (see also Petronicolos and New (1999)).
7we refer to the combination of three features: 1) how schools are funded, from public or private
sources, 2) expenditures per pupil in public and in private schools, and 3) the type of parents
most likely to send their children to public (private) school. We claim that increasing the stock
of low-skilled immigrants may alter the schooling choices of other parents for their ospring,
leading to a more segregated education system, where children from wealthy families attend
private schools with a better quality of education. Our predictions echo the empirical evidence
in the United States that immigration induces \native ight" from public into private school
(Betts and Fairlie 2003). They are also consistent with stylized facts regarding migration and
education revealed in both the U.S. census data and the OECD Programme for International
Student Assessment (2003).3 The major contribution of this paper is to provide a solid
theoretical argument for the mechanism behind this phenomenon.
In our model, the education regimes as well as the eects generated by low-skilled immigra-
tion on the education system stem from the interplay between households' choices and the
government policy which is determined through the voting of local parents. The timing of
these decisions is as follows. First, parents choose the optimal number of children consistent
with their expected choices of schooling for their ospring. Second, locals vote over the pro-
portional income tax rate and public expenditure per pupil. Finally, in accordance with the
education policy implemented, each household chooses the type of school to which they will
send their children. Since perfect foresight is assumed throughout the model, parents' ex-
pected schooling choices for their children must coincide with their a posteriori choices. This
timing of events is driven by reasonable assumptions: fertility decisions usually take place
before educational choices are made, and educational choices occur in a given framework of
an education regime that is shaped by current education policy.4
It is worth emphasizing since the beginning that, with respect to preferences or behavior, no
3See Section 3.
4In a similar framework, de la Croix and Doepke (2009) consider both this timing and another timing,
where educational choices are committed before voting takes place. They nd that the quality of public
schooling is the same or less when parents choose schooling after policy variables had been determined.
8exogenous assumptions related to racial prejudices or culturally-based dierences are imposed
between locals and immigrants. Only two empirically-supported dissimilarities between low-
skilled immigrants and low-skilled locals are assumed. The rst one concerns the extent of
political participation: it is assumed that only citizens can vote, as immigrants are usually
not immediately granted voting rights and obtaining citizenship takes a number of years.5
The second one is with respect to the \adjustment cost" of migration which can be broadly
seen as a lower wage received by low-skilled immigrant workers with respect to their local
counterparts.6
Though not entitled to vote, low-skilled immigrants can inuence the voting outcome by
aecting electors' opinions about education policy in at least two ways. First, immigrants
have a dierent impact on the demand for and the supply of public resources in education.
As voters become aware that they will have to proportion both the benets and the burdens
of public intervention in education with immigrants, their preferred education policy is likely
to be aected (Sand and Razin 2006). Second, immigrants may alter the characteristics of
the electorate even though they are not part of it. This can occur through the eect they
have on the income distribution of electors. An increase in proportion of low-skilled workers
could lead to an increase in the premium for higher skills.7 With their increased income,
high-skilled parents are likely to want better education for their children. If public schools
fail to provide the desired quality of education, these parents may choose to opt out, which
in turn may aect voters' support for the funding for public schools.
5The waiting period for obtaining citizenship is highly country-specic, and even within the same country,
it varies from case to case. For example, according to the yearly record during 1965-2008 published by the
Oce of Immigration Statistics at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, legal permanent residents
in the U.S. spent a median of seven to nine years in waiting for naturalization (see the 2008 Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics). However, before receiving permanent residency, it still requires various periods of
time for immigrants admitted via family reunion, work visa, refugee, or other programs to adjust their status.
6Theoretical models often assume that there is an adjustment cost of migration; the existence of such
costs is also supported by empirical studies. See, for example, Batista (2008).
7For example, Mayda (2006) shows that high-skilled locals are the most favorable to immigration in
countries where immigrants are, on average, relatively less skilled than the locals. This is consistent with
the idea of a rising skill premium. However, the issue of whether low-skilled immigrants adversely aect the
wages of local counterparts is still unsettled (see Card (2005) for a survey of this literature).
9We argue that local parents foresee that, with more low-skilled immigration, resources per
pupil in public school might become too low because of the eects of immigration on public
school congestion and on the average tax base. As parents are concerned about their children's
educational achievement, wealthier parents will choose to opt out of publicly funded education
and send their children to private schools where they have to pay out of their own pockets.
The reduced participation in public schooling has ambiguous eects: on the one hand, with
some children leaving the public education system, the stress which immigration places on
school resources is alleviated; on the other hand, parents who opt out are \double-taxed" for
education, so they tend to be reluctant to support taxation for public education.8 However,
if the number of low-skilled immigrants keeps increasing, a large proportion of local parents
may opt out because public-school resources per pupil are expected to decline, compared to
the initial level. At the aggregate level, from the model it turns out that having a relatively
large stock of low-skilled immigrants in the population tends to be associated with a more
segregated education regime, where children of wealthier parents are more likely to attend
private schools and enjoy better school resources whereas students from poorer families,
including those with low-skilled immigrant parents, stay behind in public schools. Finally, a
purely private regime is theoretically possible with low-skilled immigration, unless there is a
suciently high legal minimum to regulate public education expenditures or if immigrants
are entitled to vote on education policy.
This paper follows de la Croix and Doepke (2009) in incorporating endogenous fertility into
the study of schooling choices. It is well documented that parents are faced with a quan-
tity/quality trade-o for their children, which is to say, the expenditure that parents intend
to devote on each child's education is negatively correlated with the number of children they
would like to have (Becker and Barro 1988; Hanushek 1992). If the opportunity cost of hav-
ing children is greater for high-skilled parents, they might decide to have fewer children but
8See, for example, Shapiro (1986) where some arguments for using public funding to subsidize private
schools are discussed. One of them is \double taxation" for parents who send children to private school. This
argument has been used by interest groups that support vouchers for private schooling.
10educate them better, and so fertility dierentials may arise. In this respect, the arrival of
low-skilled immigrants implies an increase in the size of population possibly featuring higher
fertility rates and an increase in the opportunity costs of fertility for high-skilled workers as
their wages rise. We do not assume any exogenous dierence in fertility behavior between
locals and immigrants; if such culturally-based dierences exist, they would only serve to
strengthen our main conclusions.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by relating our contribution to previous research in
Section 2. Relevant stylized facts are then provided in Section 3. Section 4 formally presents
the model economy, and Section 5 depicts each education regime and discusses how they are
aected and possibly changed by low-skilled immigration. Finally, concluding remarks are
given in Section 6.
2 Literature review
This study relates to several streams of literature. First there is the literature on quan-
tity/quality trade-os. This highlights the links between fertility and education decisions
(Becker and Barro 1988; Hanushek 1992; Tamura 1994; de la Croix and Doepke 2003; de la
Croix and Doepke 2004). When fertility is endogenous, parents who prioritize quality may
choose to have fewer children for a given level of resources devoted to child rearing. There-
fore, when education regimes are being compared, decisions on fertility and education should
be considered jointly.
The structure of our model follows de la Croix and Doepke (2009), who show that in democra-
cies a public regime tends to be established unless income distribution is too unequal, whereas
a multiplicity of equilibria may arise in non-democracies characterized by a minimum-income
restriction for voting. Since our model considers that low-skilled immigrants are dierent from
low-skilled locals only in terms of their lack of voting rights and a lower wage, our set-up
is readily comparable to the non-democracy framework of de la Croix and Doepke (2009),
11notwithstanding which, the focus of our work is rather dierent. Whereas they mainly fo-
cus on how an education regime may be aected by a mean-preserving change in income
dispersion, we introduce the demographic impact of low-skilled immigration that leads to
a more right-skewed income distribution with a lower average tax base. In addition, we
remove the assumption of a linear production technology, thus allowing for a distributional
eect of low-skilled immigration, which endogenously raises the skill premium and increases
income inequality among the electorate. As a consequence, the direct impact of low-skilled
immigration is that it reduces the provision of public education per pupil; meanwhile, in-
creased income inequality polarizes local parents' demands for investment in their children's
education. The latter impact is similar to the force at work in de la Croix and Doepke
(2009) but not required in order for our mechanism to operate; however, it does reinforce the
mechanism, as low-skilled parents become more dependent on public education. In Section
5, we will provide a detailed discussion of the various channels through which an increase
in low-skilled immigration may aect the host country's education system. Moreover, with
multiplicity of equilibria due to heterogeneity in voting rights, we will also explore the issue
of Pareto-ranking between education regimes.9
As policy variables have redistributive eects, this work also relates to the literature on income
redistribution, voting, and education policy. As in standard models of publicly provided
private goods (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), in our work redistribution occurs from the rich
to the poor; however, the scale of redistribution varies with dierent education regimes.10
Dierent from many studies in the literature (Glomm and Ravikumar 1992; Fern andez and
Rogerson 1995; B enabou 2000; de la Croix and Doepke 2004), our model does not specify a
9An additional dierence between our setup and that of de la Croix and Doepke (2009) is that we consider
the expenditure on private education being tax non-deductible. As tax codes vary from country to country,
the extension to tax non-deductibility is a relevant robustness check because quantity-quality trade-o is
then aected by the expected tax rate. This acts to slow down the opting-out process, but not to the eect
of reversing the results.
10Some studies in this literature propose the reverse direction of redistribution (Johnson 1984; B enabou
2000). In particular, Fern andez and Rogerson (1995) model education as a good that is only partially publicly
funded by a subsidy voted for by the agents. Such a framework is able to generate the outcome that the
education of the rich is in fact subsidized by the poor, who cannot aord the remaining (private) costs of
education unless the income distribution becomes suciently equal.
12given regime for education, but allows the system to be endogenously determined. We assume
that education policy is formed through probabilistic voting, which captures the idiosyncratic
component with regards to voting over education policy. Its voting outcome is equivalent
to a smooth aggregation of preferences across all the electorate; therefore, it is not only
the median voter, but the whole distribution of voters' preferences, that matters for policy
making. Our research is related in this respect to Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002), who study
the eect of low-skilled immigration on redistributive policies in a model with human-capital
formation and majority voting for a lump-sum cash grant. There are two contrasting eects:
on the one hand, immigrants tend to join the coalition supporting greater redistribution,
but on the other hand, voters know that they will have to proportion tax revenues with
immigrants. This latter eect, known as \scal leakage", may dominate, which would imply
that a lower tax rate is voted with more low-skilled immigration.11 Assuming that immigrants
are not entitled to vote, but their children cannot be excluded from public schools, our model
also predicts that low-skilled immigration may result in a lower tax rate to nance public
education; however, the reasoning behind this is the \double taxation" argument. In this
respect, this paper proposes an alternative explanation than the racism motive postulated
in Luttmer (2001) and Lee and Roemer (2006) where the majority's racial bias against the
minority leads to less willingness to redistribute.
As already mentioned, Betts and Fairlie (2003) nd evidence that the inux of immigrants
makes local parents more prone to send their children to private schools at the secondary
level of education. Using the U.S. metropolitan areas for 1980 and 1990, they estimate
that for every four immigrants who arrive in public high schools, there is one local student
who switches to a private school. Some authors have suggested that such a result may be
related to racial prejudice among the locals (Conlon and Kimenyi 1991), and others suggest
that the cause is lower expected attainment in public school because of \peer-group" eects
(Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau 1978), or bad signaling of academic quality. Our
11In other words, even when the median voter is a low-skilled local, s/he will prefer less redistribution
because low-skilled immigration will dilute public resources.
13model is able to provide a theoretical basis for Betts and Fairlie (2003)'s conjecture that, by
increasing the pressure on resources in public schools, the arrival of immigrants induces more
local parents to opt out of the public system. In so doing, it also lowers voters' support for
funding public education. In this respect, the decision to focus on low-skilled immigration is
justied by the nding that \native ight" is more pronounced for white locals responding
to immigrant children who do not speak English at home, who are more likely to come from
low-skilled households where adults have low English-language skills.
Nevertheless, Betts and Fairlie (2003) do not nd \native ight" at the primary school level,
possibly due to neighborhood eects. These eects can be rather signicant in a system,
such as that in the U.S., where state schools are largely funded by local property taxes. This
may lead to wide variations in the quality of public schools across communities, with richer
districts having better-funded public schools, and vice versa (B enabou 1996; Fern andez and
Rogerson 1996; Fern andez 2002). Therefore, native ight into private schools is more likely
to occur in a system where public schools are all similarly resourced.12 However, the evidence
provided by Betts and Fairlie (2003) at the secondary school level suggests that residential
segregation is of less importance when it comes to high school education.13 In contrast to
the literature that studies sorting and education, we abstract from modeling neighborhood
eects but allow for sorting into public and private schools.
12In a community funded system, however, native ight may take the form of residential segregation rather
than lower enrollment in public schools.
13Betts and Fairlie (2003) argue that native ight is observed at the secondary school level for several
reasons. We nd the most pertinent to be the fact that U.S. high schools usually cover a larger area than
primary schools, and have several \feeder" primary and middle schools. So residential segregation is less
likely to imply schooling segregation in high school than in primary school. In response to immigration, local
parents may nd it more attractive to educate their children in private schools in the neighborhood than to
move to another community.
143 Some stylized facts
In addition to the empirical evidence provided by Betts and Fairlie (2003) for the United
States that immigration was associated with locals opting out of public secondary schools
between 1980 and 1990, this section provides a number of stylized facts regarding how low-
skilled immigration may be associated with local parents' schooling choices between 1990 and
2000 in the U.S.; moreover, the correlation between education and fertility is also presented
as we argued earlier that they are jointly determined. Then, using the micro data collected
by the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2003, we take a
cross-country snap shot of the schooling choices made by immigrants and locals of dierent
skill types.
3.1 U.S., 1990 and 2000
With U.S. Census Data 1990 and 2000, we identify three types of students: immigrant
students with low-skilled parents, local students with low-skilled parents and local students
with high-skilled parents. Following Betts and Fairlie (2003), all the students are aged
between 7 and 16, and were enrolled in either public or private schools. The residence of
each student is identied by metropolitan areas. Skill type is dened on the basis of the
total personal income of parents.14 High-skilled parents are those with total income above
the mean for their residential area, and those below the mean are considered as low-skilled.
Students with immigrant parents are identied by checking that neither of his/her parents
have U.S. citizenship (i.e., they are not entitled to vote).15
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the three student groups are characterized by very dierent
schooling choices and numbers of siblings. It is shown that that students with high-skilled
14As a robustness check, we also included the highest educational attainment and the highest score on
the Hauser and Warren socioeconomic index. These were used to investigate whether parental skill was
positively correlated with enrollment in private school and negatively correlated with household fertility. All
the correlations have the expected sign, and are signicant.
15More descriptions of the data can be found in Appendix A.1.
15local parents have, on average, the highest rate of private school enrollment and their parents
have the lowest level of fertility, while the opposite holds for students with low-skilled immi-
grant parents. While these tables are computed from the overall sample, a further step is to
consider the area averages of private school enrollment and fertility rate for local students,
and then check how frequently the sign of mean dierence is consistent with the aggregate
sample. It turns out that in a large majority of the areas (87% in 1990 and 97% in 2000) a
higher proportion of students with high-skilled than with low-skilled local parents attended
private schools; similarly, in 75 % of the areas in 1990 and 79% in 2000 the average fertility
rates for the low-skilled locals were higher than those for high-skilled locals.16
Next, we utilize the geographical information about each student to study the impact of
changes in the proportion of students with low-skilled immigrant parents in each area between
1990 and 2000. These changes are available for both years in 103 areas, and as shown in
Figure 3, have a positive relationship with changes in the enrollment rate of local students
at private schools. The correlation between the two variables is 0.371, which is statistically
signicant at the 99% level.17 The positive correlation is supported by further renements.
When the denition is restricted to those parents with low English prociency, (i.e. those who
claim to speak English less than 'very well'), the correlation is 0.355, which is still signicant.
When we focus on those parents who arrived in the U.S. less than a decade prior to each
census year, the relationship is even stronger, at 0.416, and becomes even more signicant.
Finally, based on the quantity/quality trade-o argument, it is expected that increased en-
rollment in private school among locals should be associated with an enlargement of their
fertility dierential. To examine this relationship, we consider the correlation between vari-
ables measuring the changes in the dierential in private-school enrollment rates among locals
(i.e. changes in the average enrollment rate of students with high-skilled local parents minus
16Note that the sample areas are not identically identied in these two years. In particular, the samples in
2000 are geographically much more concentrated, in the sense that they only spread over 106 metropolitan
areas, while samples in 1990 spread over 297 metropolitan areas.
17All the correlations are weighted by the number of students with low-skilled immigrant parents in the
respective area.
16that of students with low-skilled local parents) and changes in the fertility dierential (com-
puted as changes in the average fertility rate of low-skilled locals minus that of high-skilled
locals).18 Figure 4 depicts a positive relation between these two intertemporal changes in
dierentials. The correlation for a total of 104 areas is 0.210, and is statistically signicant
at the 95% level, suggesting that an increasing gap in private school participation is indeed
associated with a widening in fertility dierential.19
3.2 Cross country, 2003
Are the afovementioned stylized facts specic to the U.S.? Although we cannot oer a denite
answer, a similar pattern regarding schooling choice is however found in our crude analysis
using the cross-country micro-data collected by the OECD Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA), 2003. The primary sampling unit in this dataset is individual
15-year-olds, and the main variable of interest for us is the proportion of public funding
received by the school that a student attends. Three types of students are identied for
35 countries. As in the U.S. Census Data, we dene an immigrant student as one both
whose parents were foreign born.20 However, since PISA does not contain information about
students' household income, parental occupational status is used instead to distinguish skill
types.21
Table 3 shows the average public share of school funding for each type of student by country,
grouped by regime.22 Figure 5 plots all 35 countries according to the average share of pub-
18There are two advantages to considering changes in dierences over time. Firstly, by considering inter-
temporal changes, the inuences of cross-sectional and time-constant factors on the variables of interest can
be limited. Secondly, the use of dierences can partly oset the eect of any possible common time trends
in the series.
19As before, the correlations are weighted by the number of students with low-skilled immigrant parents in
each area. Notice that, while the mean private school enrollment rate is calculated across student samples,
the average fertility is computed using households as the unit of analysis so that it is not upwardly biased
by students coming from high-fertility households. As a robustness check, we also construct private-school
enrollment rates at the household level. The correlation is lower, but still positive and signicant.
20This category includes all students who themselves were foreign-born.
21See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed description of data.
22We follow the PISA 2003 Data Analysis Manual (OECD, 2005) in the computation of means, standard
17lic funding their schools receive, and the variations of the share between dierent types of
students within each country. It is observed that there are three main clusters of countries.
We dene countries with lower than 60% of average public funding as being in the private
regime. These countries are Indonesia, Mexico, Macao-China and Turkey; they are all char-
acterized by a low public shares of funding for each type of student. On the other hand,
there is a cluster of countries with high average proportions of public funding of schools, and
a variation of less than 3% between the dierent types of student. We dene these countries
as in the public regime. Most of them are Northern or Central European countries or parts of
the former U.S.S.R.. The remaining countries are dened as being in the segregation regime,
with those having variations of more than 10% between dierent groups of students being
dened as severely segregated.
What we nd the most interesting is that, in 16 of the 17 countries in the segregation regime
(Tunisia being the only exception), local students with highly skilled parents attend schools
with the lowest average proportion of public funding. In other words, the children of local
high-skilled parents are more likely to attend private schools than other types of students,
which is consistent with the U.S. pattern summarized in Table 1.
Next, we combined data from the PISA 2003 study with the Docquier-Lowell-Marfouk (2009)
dataset in order to take advantage of their information about the skills of immigrants by
destination. At the end, we had data on immigration stocks for 8 countries listed under
the public regime (Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland and Sweden) and 12 countries under the segregation regime (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland
and the United States). Table 3 provides the average level and 10-year change of low-skilled
immigration (measured either as stocks or as proportions of the total population) for countries
with public and segregation regimes. We nd that these averages are larger for the group
of countries classied in the segregation regime, consistent with the positive relationship
errors of the mean and condence intervals.
18between low-skilled immigration and private school enrollment which we observed in the
U.S..23
4 Model economy
In this section, we assess the building blocks of our model economy. We put forward a general
equilibrium model of rational expectations and voting, which predicts that a larger group of
low-skilled immigrants makes it less likely that a public schooling regime is the equilibrium, as
more local parents send their children into private school. We begin with household decisions,
then move to the production sector and nally to the political mechanism.
4.1 Households
The economy is populated by households with identical preferences over consumption c, num-
ber of children n, and the investment in children's basic education . Part of the population
is composed of immigrants (M). Locals are either high-skilled (H) or low-skilled (L). Since
we are focusing on low-skilled immigration, we assume that all immigrants are low-skilled.24




i) +  ln(
i)]; i = fM;L;Hg (1)
The parameter  > 0 captures the weight of child-caring in the household utility, whereas
 2]0;1[ denotes the taste for child quality, relative to the quantity of children.25 Notice
that no exogenous dierence in preferences between immigrants and locals is imposed on the
23The analysis is carried out according to either a stricter denition of low-skilled immigrants as those with
less than secondary education, or a broader one applying to those with less than tertiary education.
24Alternatively we can assume that the immigrants, although high-skilled, only have access to low-skill
jobs.
25It is constrained to be less than one to guarantee an interior solution to parents' optimization problem.
19model.26
Each household is endowed with one unit of time. Raising one child is assumed to cost a
fraction  2]0;1[ of parents' time, so that the opportunity cost of having children is higher
for parents with greater earning potential. In addition, human capital is acquired through
formal education, which incurs a pecuniary cost. Parents may choose to educate their children
in public schools (so that i = s, where s denotes the quality of public school nanced by
general income taxation), or in private schools (so that i = ei, where ei denotes the quality of
education purchased by parents on the private schooling market). A child who receives more
investment in his/her basic education has a higher probability of nishing tertiary education
and becoming a high-skilled adult.27 It is assumed that the cost of private education is not
tax deductible.28 We can write the household budget constraint as:






where  2 [0;1] is the proportional income tax rate that yields sucient government revenue
to nance public education; wi denotes the wage rate rewarded to one unit of labor time
devoted by adults of type i. Notice that enrolling in public school is free of direct charge,
while parents opting for private schooling have to pay the full costs of educating their children.
Clearly, parents choosing public education set ei = 0. For the sake of simplicity, the cost of
one unit of school quality is set to unity.
The timing of events is as follows. First, each household makes its fertility decision, consistent
with the expected schooling choice for their ospring. Next, locals vote about income tax
26Sand and Razin (2006) assume a higher exogenous fertility rate for immigrants than for locals. Making
the similar assumption in our model that immigrants are more likely than locals to favor quantity over quality
(i.e.,  is lower for immigrants than for locals) only strengthens our results.
27While it is assumed that, through i, parents derive utility out of \joy of giving", this also implicitly
captures the idea that parents care about their children's skill level.
28Regulations on the tax deductibility of private school expenses vary from country to country. We assume
non-deductibility, as is the case in the U.S.; de la Croix and Doepke (2009) assume full deductibility. The
main dierence is that, when private education is tax deductible, the choice between the quantity of children
and the quality of their education is not aected by taxation. However, the qualitative result that low-skilled
immigration may cause locals to opt out of public education remain valid.
20rates and public school expenditure per pupil; the outcome of this voting therefore determines
the quality of public education. Depending on the dierence between the quality of the
determined public school education and the quality of education they want for their children,
households (both local and immigrant) then make the nal decision on whether to educate
their children in public (free of charge) or private (paid for directly by parents) schools.
Perfect foresight is assumed for all individual decisions.
Before addressing the labor market block of the model, it is convenient to show the results of
fertility decisions by maximizing Equation (1) subject to Equation (2). Parents anticipating
public schooling, i.e., [i]
e = s, choose the following fertility rate ^ n:





As expected, fertility is increasing in the child-caring parameter  and decreasing in the time
cost of child-rearing . On the other hand, parents anticipating private schooling choose ~ n
and ei such that:










The following lemma then arises:
Lemma 1 (Fertility Dierential) Parents who anticipate private schooling choose to have
fewer children than those who anticipate public schooling.
~ n < ^ n
Proof: This inequality is immediately proved by comparing Equations (3) and (4). 
21The intuition underlying this is that, given identical homothetic preferences, each household
uses the same optimal allocation rule to distribute resources between child-caring and con-
sumption.29 Those parents who anticipate sending their children to public schools are only
faced with the opportunity costs (in terms of working time) of having children, since there are
no direct costs associated with their children's education. In comparison, parents planning
to use private schools expect to pay all the costs of their children acquiring human capital,
and therefore, these parents reduce their opportunity costs by having fewer children. This is
why the quantity/quality trade-o parameter  only appears in ~ n.
Spending on private education ei increases with the taste for children's human capital ,
household income wi and the time cost of child-rearing . The last result occurs because, as
child-rearing becomes more time-consuming, having one additional child is relatively more
expensive than providing better education for the children who are already born. Further, it
is observed that ei is decreasing in the tax rate , due to our tax non-deductibility assumption.
In other words, in our model making private education tax deductible will lead to a higher
quality of private schooling. Similarly, any policy that reduces tuition and other costs of
private education will have the eect of increasing the incentive to opt out of the public
system.
4.2 Production
Let us now move to the labor market block of our economy. In order to capture the potential
eect of low-skilled immigration on the skill premium, a Cobb-Douglas production function
is assumed with high- and low-skilled labor as imperfect substitutes that are combined to
produce a composite output with a price of unity.30 Later on, it will become clear that our
29More precisely, the total resources available to a household are the time endowment (unity) evaluated
at the market wage, or wi. Due to homothetic utility, the proportion of resources devoted to consumption is
constant at a given tax rate, i.e., 1 
1+.
30The existence of a skill wage premium is well documented in the empirical studies. The recent work by
Card (2009) estimates a college-to-high school wage premium that is consistent with an elasticity of substi-
tution ranging from 1.5 to 2.5. Meanwhile, he nds high substitutability between natives and immigrants,
22theoretical predictions remain valid even if constant wage rates are assumed. However, an
increased skill premium with low-skilled immigration reinforces the mechanism and speeds
up the transition of education systems in the host society. Additionally, it is assumed that
immigrants bear the adjustment costs of relocating to the destination country.31 These costs
are reected in lower wages for immigrants than for low-skilled locals, or technically speaking,
in the parameter  2]0;1[ which denotes the lower productivity of immigrants. This, and the
fact that immigrants cannot vote, are the only exogenous dierences in our model between
a low-skilled immigrant and a low-skilled local.
Denoting production by y , and the total hours worked by high-skilled locals, low-skilled




Under perfect competition, y = mwM + lwL + hwH with
w

















Without loss of generality, the number of low-skilled locals can be normalized to 1, the ratio
of high- to low-skilled locals expressed by , and the ratio of immigrants to low-skilled locals
by . The total hours devoted to work in each household are the unity time endowment, less
especially for the less educated. In reality, skill wage premium could arise from a number of reasons (e.g., the
host country's specialization in skill-intensive products and/or consumers' love for variety of sophisticated
goods); however, since the exact form of the producer sector is not central to our analysis, for the sake of par-
simony a one-good Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed with two skill types as inputs. Therefore,
low-skilled natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes and the implied substitutability between skills is
slightly lower than empirically observed.
31For our purposes, the adjustment costs assumption basically implies that immigrants receive lower wages.
Evidence for this has been found in several studies (Borjas 1994). Using the 1970 U.S. Census Data, Chiswick
(1978) estimates that, at the time of arrival, an immigrant receives a wage 17% below that of a similarly
skilled local.
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where  i denotes the proportion of parents type i who anticipate educating their children in





[ and  2 [0;1].
The rst condition ensures a skill premium by assuming that high-skilled labor is always
scarcer.32 The second restriction avoids the implausible situation in which there are more
low-skilled immigrants than low-skilled locals, but can be easily relaxed.33 It follows that
wM = wL < wL < wH.
4.3 Political mechanism
As explained in Section 1, we assume that the quality of public schooling s and the propor-
tional income tax rate  are determined via probabilistic voting, which displays convenient
properties that take the whole distribution of preferences into account. While basic education
is widely acknowledged as a fundamental human right,34 less shared is the opinion on the
right extent of public provision. It is likely that the utility parents derive from the amount
of investment spent on their own children is not the only determinant in the voting behavior
with respect to education policy, but other elements can play a role (e.g., ideologies, indi-
vidual experience, local traditions, etc.). We implicitly capture this idiosyncratic component
by adopting the probabilistic voting mechanism. It can be shown that the political outcome









> 1, or =(1   ) > h=(l + m). We could have had introduced a skill productivity
parameter which would also have guaranteed that high-skilled workers received higher wages. However, for
the sake of parsimony, we simply imposed this reasonable restriction on .
33 itself may be aected by the education system in the receiving country. However, for the sake of
simplicity, we consider  as exogenous.
34See, for example, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.
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where ^ Ui and ~ Ui denote respectively the expected (indirect) utility of local parents of type
i who anticipate using public (ni = ^ n and [i]
e = s) and private (ni = ~ n and [i]
e = ei)
schooling. The maximization of 
[;s] is constrained by the government budget balance,
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:
From this maximization problem we have the following lemma:36
35Probabilistic voting is based on the idea that political candidates are uncertain of voters' behavior.





B) and denote its density function by fj(): F j() is increasing in the dierence between j's utility level
associated with candidate A's policy platform and that with candidate B's. Thus, candidate A's maximization






= 0, with fj evaluated at 0, for that candidate
B faces the symmetric problem, and at equilibrium, both candidates choose the same platform under the
assumption of simultaneous platform announcement. Hence, the determination of the policy variables is
equivalent to maximizing a social welfare function where the utility of each voter is weighted by f j(0) (see
(Persson and Tabellini 2000) for a detailed discussion). In this paper, we assume for simplicity that f j(0) is
identical for all voters.
36Notice that we do not distinguish the anticipated and the actual schooling choices in the maximization
problem; in other words,  i is not only the expected but also the realized public school enrollment rate for
parents of type i. Nevertheless, given our timing of events with actual schooling choices made after the voting
stage, the more rigorous treatment would be having the actual public school enrollment rates endogenously
determined by the policy variables. We present the parametric treatment for its analytical tractability, and
the voting outcome is valid as long as the perfect foresight assumption is maintained at equilibrium so that the
expected and the actual choices coincide. Recall that fertility choices are made at the rst stage, jointly with
the anticipated schooling choices; therefore, the fertility dierential between parents expecting public and
private education (see Lemma 1) generates the lock-in eect that guarantees local stability of the equilibrium
characterized by perfect foresight. A fully developed discussion is available from the authors upon request.
25Lemma 2 (Voted policy) The income tax rate determined via probabilistic voting is:

 =
  (  H +  L)
(1 +  )(1 + )
(13)
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^ n(  H +  L +  M)
(14)
Proof: See Appendix B.1. 
Intuitively, the tax rate depends positively on the propensities to spend on children,  and
, and on local parents' anticipated participation in public schooling,  H and  L. If a lower
proportion of high-skilled locals than of low-skilled locals anticipate public schooling for their
children (as will be shown to be true unless the proportions are equal), then an increase in
the relative number of high-skilled locals, , will lead to a lower tax rate. The reason is
that those parents who anticipate private schooling for their children are less supportive of
redistribution through the provision of public education, from which their children will not
benet. Hence, whenever  H <  L, an increase in  implies that the proportion of the
electorate who favor less redistribution increases.
The denominator of Equation (14) consists of the total number of children expected to
attend public school. Thus, for a given tax revenue, higher expected participation in public
school ( i) leads to lower expenditure per pupil (used here as a proxy for quality) in public
26schools. Moreover, since y = hwH + lwL + mwM with h, l and m dened in Equations
(9), (10) and (11), higher expected participation in public school also results in a lower
tax base because parents who anticipate public schooling have more children, which requires
more of their time to be devoted to child-rearing and less to work. Nevertheless, as mentioned
above, the income tax rate increases with locals' anticipated participation in public education.
Therefore, the expected participation of local children induces contrasting eects, while the
expected participation of immigrant children unambiguously lowers the quality of public
schools ceteris paribus. Finally, an increase in the number of low-skilled immigrants ()
contributes positively to the quality of public schools through an increased tax base (a positive
eect on the supply side), although it lowers quality when the children of new immigrants
attend public schools (a negative eect on the demand side, or a congestion eect).37
Notice that the tax rate chosen by voters is not directly aected by the number of low-skilled
immigrants (), or by the proportion of them anticipating sending their children to public
schools ( M). In fact, they only aect the quality of public school. This is because the
socially determined tax rate reects the aggregated preferences of locals about the allocation
of income between consumption and child-caring. With the assumed homothetic utility
function in Equation (1), this rule of allocation is not aected by the income level, but is
determined by preferences and the composition of the electorate.38 The weight that a society
places upon education as opposed to consumption, can be denoted by   =

1+ 2]0;1[. If
all voters expect to make use of public schools for their children, the tax rate they choose
will correspond exactly to  . However, if some local parents anticipate opting out of public
education and choosing private schooling, the tax rate will decrease accordingly (since these
parents do not expect to benet from public schools and thus tend to vote for a lower tax rate).
In Section 5, we will show how low-skilled immigration alters local parents' expectations about
37As it will be shown later, all the children of low-skilled immigrants go to publicly funded schools as long
as local voters support public expenditure for education.
38Note that the technology parameter  and the adjustment costs , which aect wages, play no role in
determining the tax rate. As long as the tax rate is independent of wages, it is not aected by  by either
the skill premium or the tax base.
27the schooling of their children ( H and  L). Through this channel, we will show that  and
 M indirectly aect the voted tax rate  
 H; L), as expressed in Equation (13).
4.4 Equilibria
In this subsection we will characterize the equilibria. Up to now,  i has been dealt with as an
exogenous parameter that reects the proportion of parents of type i who anticipate making
use of public schools. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, parents' expected schooling
choices will coincide with their a posteriori decisions, i.e.,  i is eectively the public school
enrollment rate. At equilibrium, parents' preferences and the education regime are mutually
consistent.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium) A set of public school enrollment rates f H; L; Mg, a set of
policy variables fs;g and a set of household variables f^ ni; ~ ni;eig constitute an equilibrium
if and only if: 8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 i = 1 , ^ Ui > ~ Ui
 i 2 [0;1] , ^ Ui = ~ Ui
 i = 0 , ^ Ui < ~ Ui
; 8i:
This means that, given their own fertility decisions and the outcomes of the voting on tax
rates, parents then decide on the schooling of their ospring (which is in eect the realization
of their anticipated choices). Since all households have the same preferences, and parents
of the same type receive the same wage, parents of type i will all choose public education
if it yields higher utility (and the same goes for private education). However, when the
resulting utility does not dier from one type of school to the other, some parents of type i
will choose public education, while others will pay for their children's education from their
own pockets.39
39In other words, there could exist an interior value for  i such that the marginal household is indierent
between private and public schools.
28In order to investigate the situation further, we proceed as follows. First, we obtain the tax
rate from the government budget balance and write it as a linear function in s:
(s) = s  T( 
H; 
L; 
M) where T() =
^ n( H+ L+ M)
y( H; L; M)  0:40 (15)
Then (s) is plugged into the indirect utility function V i, where fertility and private education
spending are solved for parents with either schooling choice (see Equations (3), (4) and (5)).
In this way, indirect utilities depend only on the policy variable s and on public school






^ V i(s; H; L; M)
~ V i(s; H; L; M)
if
ni = ^ n and i = s
ni = ~ n and i = ei
; i = fM;L;Hg:
Next, we dene i = ^ V i   ~ V i, which is the net gain from choosing public education. At
equilibrium (as dened in Denition 1), it must be that
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 i = 1 , i(s; H; L; M) > 0
 i 2 [0;1] , i(s; H; L; M) = 0
 i = 0 , i(s; H; L; M) < 0
; 8i:
It is clear that at equilibrium the set of public school enrollment rates

 H; L; M	
is
aected by the socially determined quality of public schooling, s.
Lemma 3 (Opting-out and enrollment rates)
1. There exists a unique and feasible level of public school quality,  si( H; L; M), such
that i = 0, i.e., parents are indierent between public and private schools.
2. For any s > [<] si, all parents of type i send their children to public [private] schools.
40The denominator of T() expresses the total production in terms of public enrollment rates: y =
y( H; L; M) > 0 (see Section 4.2).
293. It holds: 0 <  sM <  sL <  sH.
4.  H > 0 )  L = 1,  L > 0 )  M = 1;
 L = 0 )  H = 0,  M = 0 () ( L = 0;  H = 0).
Proof: See Appendix B.2. 
Figure 1: Critical levels of public school quality
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Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 3. It shows that, if the quality of public schooling is not satis-
factorily high, parents will choose private schooling despite its cost. This is because parents
care about their children's human capital.41 As the quality of public schooling declines,
high-skilled parents are the rst to opt out, followed by low-skilled locals and then by immi-
grants. Thus, as Point 4 states, when some high-income parents choose public education, all
lower-income parents follow suit. Notice that no children at all enroll in public schools below
a certain quality threshold,  sL. This follows from the assumption that immigrants cannot
41It can easily be shown that  si increases with the taste for quality, .
30vote. In other words, no locals choose public education if they expect its quality to be below
 sL, and they then vote to have zero taxation, which means that public education cannot be
provided.
5 Education regimes and low-skilled immigration
In the previous section, the equilibrium was dened and its properties were discussed: Lemma
2 describes the voting behavior with given rates of participation in public schooling, while
Lemma 3 gives the participation rates that result from a given expenditure on schools. In this
section, we rst use these results to assess whether, and under which conditions, a certain
education regime emerges as a stable equilibrium. Then, the eects of low-skilled immigration
are investigated both within each regime and across regimes (i.e., how low-skilled immigration
brings about changes in education regime).
5.1 Education regimes
An education regime is dened as a stable equilibrium where the participation rates f H; L; Mg







. This can be considered as an exogenous indicator of parental preference
for quantity of children over the quality of their education (i.e.,  decreases monotonically
with ). We summarize the possible education regimes in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Education regimes) There are four possible education regimes. The fea-
tures and the conditions under which each of them emerges are as follows:
42An equilibrium is dened in Denition 1. On top of that, stability is required for an equilibrium to
represent an economically sensible education regime.
31Education regime  H  L  M s  Condition
Public 1 1 1 s >  sH   C < 
Partial Segregation 2 [0;1] 1 1 s =  sH  (1+ H)
1+ B    C
Segregation 0 1 1 s 2] sL;  sH[  
1+ A <  < B
Private 0 0 0 s   sL 0
with
A 
(1 + )[(1 + )(1 +  )    ]
wH
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Proof: See Appendix C.1. 
From Proposition 1, we can immediately observe at least three implications. First, public
school enrollment is increasing in  This is because, when parents care more about child
quality (i.e., a lower ), they are more willing to invest in their education privately ceteris
paribus and thus more likely to opt out of the public system in favor of a private school.
Second, in the (partial) segregation regime the average fertility of locals is lower than that
of immigrants, because highly skilled local parents who opt out of public schooling have
fewer children, as stated in Lemma 1. Fertility dierentials between low-skilled and highly
skilled locals arise in all the segregation regimes, and widen with the degree of segregation.
Low-skilled locals whose children remain in public schools have the same fertility rate as
low-skilled immigrants.43
43To a certain degree, Kahn (1994)'s ndings lend support to this result. Using data from the U.S. Census
and Current Population Survey, she concludes that, by the late 1980s, the standardized fertility levels of
locals and immigrants were virtually identical, and that immigrants' higher fertility rates were due to the
composition of this group in terms of demographic, socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics. Our model
suggests that, other things being equal, the higher average fertility rate of immigrants may be the result of
32Finally, Proposition 1 also implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1 An equilibrium

 H; L; M;s;	
=
n




with  L 2 [0;1]
is unstable; therefore, it fails to qualify as an education regime.
Proof: See Appendix C.2. 
Corollary 1 implies that, if all the highly skilled locals choose private education for their
children, all low-skilled locals will follow suit as soon as one of them decides to leave the
state system. This is not a surprising result because, when low-skilled locals expect to have
no preference for public or private schooling at a given tax rate, they are better o choosing
private education and paying no tax. This is because public school resources funded by tax
revenue are always shared with children of low-skilled immigrants.
5.2 Eects of low-skilled immigration
In this section, we discuss the impact of increasing low-skilled immigration on each education
regime and show whether and how a regime change may take place. More precisely, we
investigate the eect of an increase in  on A;B;C, which determine the conditions under
which an education regime serves as a stable equilibrium.
With close inspection, how low-skilled immigration impacts the host country's education
system can be decomposed into two main channels: the demographic eect and the income
eect. The former is related to the their supply of and their demand for public education,
while the latter concerns the rise of high-skilled wage and the fall of low-skilled wage, thus
widening the skill premium wH=wL. Since  si is positively related to wi (see eq. (19)),
the income eect unambiguously increases the gap between  sL,  sM on one side and  sH on
the other side. It makes highly skilled parents more capable of aording private schooling,
both their lower income and their choice of public schooling.
33whereas low-skilled parents become more dependent on publicly nanced education due to
their decreased income.
As for the demographic eect, it can be observed more clearly by rewriting, for instance, the
lower bound of the Public Regime (C) as follows:





On the one hand, low-skilled immigrants increase total production, and the tax base: y =
(1 ^ n)(wH +wl +wM). On the other hand, immigrant children receive public education
and thus increase the number of public school pupils: ^ n(1 +  + ). The net demographic
eect is increased congestion in public schools, as the average tax base is in fact decreased
and so school resources per pupil decline; that is to say, the second factor of C0 increases.
Therefore, the demographic eect narrows the gap between the expenditure on public schools
(i.e., their quality) resulting from voting and the opt-out threshold for highly skilled parents.
We have shown that an analogous eect is produced through the income eect, specically via
increasing the rst factor of C0. Recall that C = C0 <  is required for the education system
to be a public regime. Hence, increasing low-skilled immigration makes it more and more
likely that high-skilled locals choose to opt out of public schools (i.e.,  " ) (s    sH) #),
thus destituting the public regime.
Similarly, the lower bound of the Partial Segregation Regime (B) is positively aected
by both the net demographic eect (congestion in public school) and the income eect. As
congestion and skilled wage both increase due to an increase in , more and more highly
skilled parents prefer to opt out, and in so doing, they alleviate congestion such that s =  sH
is maintained. With a growing number of highly skilled parents choosing lower fertility and
private schooling,  H becomes lower. Eventually when all the highly skilled parents have
opted out, the partial segregation regime then vanishes into the segregation regime. Notice
that, in this regime, the income eect is partially counteracted by the increased supply of
34high-skilled labor, which occurs owing to the greater opportunity cost of child-rearing.44 In
addition, while both the upper bound (C) and the lower bound (B) of the partial segregation
regime rise with , C does not increase as fast as B. Therefore, when  is suciently high,
it becomes impossible for the condition of partial segregation regime { B    C { to hold
true.
In the Segregation Regime, the net demographic eect of school congestion is present as
usual. It raises both the upper and the lower bounds in the condition { A <  < B { by
deteriorating school quality s (which already lies below  sH) and bringing it closer to  sL.
In comparison, the income eect is asymmetrical at the extremes. While, as seen above,
it increases B (making the complete withdrawal of highly skilled parents from the state
system more likely), it decreases A because the reduced low-skill wage translates into greater
dependence of low-skilled parents on the public provision of education. Hence, the income
eect tends to widen the distance between the boundaries. If the income eect dominates,
the segregation regime is more likely to remain as the stable equilibrium even with a large
increase in low-skilled immigration, since low-skilled locals will never be able to pay for private
education with a quality higher than the public schools. If instead the net demographic eect
(greater congestion) becomes dominant, i.e.,  " ) (s    sL) #, even low-skilled locals who
receive a reduced wage will nd it more and more tempting to opt out of public schooling
since public resources per pupil will decline substantially.
Finally, notice that a Private Regime may exist at any positive level of .45 This means
that, when all the locals anticipate opting out of public schooling because of their low ex-
pectations of its school quality, they choose to nance their children's education out of own
pockets. To prevent a net redistribution toward immigrants, locals vote not to be taxed.
This occurs since immigrants are not entitled to vote; in other words, immigration does not
44This counteracting eect is peculiar to partial segregation regime, since in other regimes the skill premium
is not dependent on  i (see the denition of B in Proposition 1).
45When there is no immigration, the private regime never arises since lim L!0 sjf=0; H=0g >
lim L!0  sL

f=0; H=0g. This property is formally presented and discussed by de la Croix and Doepke
(2009).
35change the relative size of high- to low-skilled voters.46
The analysis performed so far suggests that changes in low-skilled immigration may alter the
education regime. Indeed, this is conrmed in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Regime change) A suciently large increase in the number of low-skilled
immigrants triggers local parents to opt out of the public school system and lowers enrollment
at these schools (i.e.
P
i  i; i = fH;L;Mg). Moreover, if the education regime does not
immediately become private in response to an increase in immigration, the change of regime
follows the direction of: public ! (partial segregation !) segregation ! private.
Proof: See Figure 2. 
Suppose that an economy is characterized by a public regime when it opens its door to
low-skilled immigrants. As  grows beyond a certain size, it is expected that, through
the demographic eect (worsened public school congestion) and the income eect (private
education becoming more aordable for highly skilled locals), there will be a gradual change
into a partial segregation regime, or a segregation regime as shown in Figure 2.47
The left panel of Figure 2 allows us to disentangle the demographic from the income eect,
by keeping wages constant. It can be seen that an increase in low-skilled immigration will
deteriorate congestion in public schools and induce the system to change from a public regime,
to a (partially segregated,) segregated, and nally end up in a private regime. However, when
coupled with the income eect (see the right panel of Figure 2), the transition may linger at
the segregation regime if  raises the skill premium by a large degree,which acts to decrease
the lower bound for the condition of segregation regime (A) thus osetting the demographic
46In reality, this assumption is translated into the waiting period between the time of entry and obtaining
full citizenship, or the period when immigrants are restricted in their political participation. Depending
on the country-specic regulations, and the category of immigration, this can be from a few years to an
indenite period of time. If low-skilled immigrants were granted voting rights, a conguration such as the
one in Corollary 1 could emerge as an education regime.
47Notice that it is theoretically possible for the public regime to jump to a private one at any positive level
of . As shown in Section 3, however, in reality we do not observe purely private regimes (i.e., zero spending
on public education): minimum levels of public education usually exist.





















































( = 1;  = 0:6;  = 0:6;  = 0:9)
PUB: public regime, PSG: partial segregation regime, SEG: segregation regime, PRI: private regime
37eect that tends to raise this boundary. In any case, the income eect is not essential to
generate our theoretical predictions. Rather, it reinforces the demographic eect that leads
to a more segregated education regime.
Comparing all the regimes, we nd that the tax rate decreases as more local children attend
private schools. This can be written as:
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Knowing the direction of potential regime changes from Proposition 2, we obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 2 (Decreasing tax rate) A suciently large increase in the number of low-
skilled immigrants tends to lower the tax rate that locals vote for,  .
This echoes Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002)'s nding where they show both theoretically
and empirically that low-skilled immigration is associated with less redistribution. However,
instead of the \scal leakage" motive they propose, the trigger behind Corollary 2 is that
highly skilled locals who opt out of public schooling would like to minimize \double taxation",
a phrase used to describe the situation where parents with children in private schools also
pay (via tax) for public schools.
Note that multiple equilibria are always possible. For example, within a certain range of
, an education regime may be either public, segregated, or private because of self-fullling
prophecies, and the strategic complementarity among voters of the same type with respect
to schooling choices. When all highly skilled parents anticipate public schooling, voters will
set the budget for public schools so high that no parents will nd it worthwhile to send
their children to private schools. Consequently, every child will attend public school. By
the same token, when all the highly skilled parents anticipate private schooling, the resulting
budget for public schools will be so low that all highly skilled parents indeed opt out of public
38schooling. In this case, whether the education regime ends up as a segregated or a private
one will depend on the choices made by low-skilled local parents.48
5.3 Regime ranking
Since multiple equilibria always exist in our model but locals do not coordinate their actions
and decisions are made in a decentralized way, the actual regime may not be optimal in terms
of the aggregated welfare of all the locals (
 in Equation (12)). In this section, we investigate
the cardinal ranking of outcomes across regimes according to 
.
We begin by considering the pairwise ranking between the private regime and the other
regimes (because the private regime can always exist with low-skilled immigration). Let us
abstract for the moment from the impact of immigration on wages (i.e., constant wages) so
that a larger size of low-skilled immigration has simply the eect of increasing congestion
and decreasing education quality s in public school. It turns out that the necessary and
sucient conditions for the private regime to weakly dominate the public and the segregation















































They imply that public (or segregation) regime outperforms the private one as long as it
provides a public school quality s above a certain threshold. The private regime becomes
more likely to dominate when immigration increases and congestion exacerbates in public
school, which leads to the decline of school quality. This occurs because, through the public
48See de la Croix and Doepke (2009) for more discussion of strategic complementarity.
39system, locals spend part of their income to subsidize the education of immigrant children,
which, in our model, does not improve locals' welfare and creates a loss of eciency. This is
close to the spirit of \scal leakage" mentioned by Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002). With
non-constant wages, an increase in low-skilled immigration enlarges the skill premium and
lowers wL. In Condition 17, this introduces an advantage for the segregation regime over
the private one since the low-skilled locals become more dependent on public provision of
education, and therefore, the benecial eect of redistribution is higher. While this is also
true for Condition 16, the picture is complicated by the fact that high-skilled locals, when
enjoying a larger skill premium, would prefer a higher school quality that becomes less likely
to be satised by the public system owed to worsening congestion. In summary, scal leakage
and declined public school quality make it more likely that the private regime yields greater
welfare from the locals' point of view, unless the low-skilled wage is so negatively impacted
that redistribution from high to low-skilled locals becomes highly preferable.
Let us now move to the comparison between the private and the partial segregation regimes.





wL  (1   PSG)
 (1+)
  : (18)
Condition 18 looks quite dierent from Conditions 16 and 17 because, in the partial segre-
gation regime, increasing immigration induces a growing share of high-skilled parents to opt
for private school, which then alleviates public school congestion. Condition 18 shows that
the partial segregation regime dominates the private one if wage inequality (the LHS) is so
large that it is worth redistributing resources from the the more to the less wealthy locals,
notwithstanding the eciency loss due to scal leakage towards the immigrants (the RHS,
which is increasing in PSG). Hence, by widening the wage gap among locals and by inducing
a lower voted tax rate, increased low-skilled immigration makes it more likely that the partial
segregation regime is socially more preferable than a purely private system.
40From the previous discussion, and as illustrated by Figure 2, with some sets of parameters
(particularly with large ), it is possible for the education system to end up in the public, the
segregation, or the private regime. The following inequality expresses the condition under


























Since an increase in  drives up the LHS and does not aect the RHS, it makes the segregation
regime more likely to dominate. This is because scal leakage may become so severe in the
public regime that it greatly reduces the eective redistribution from high- to low-skilled
locals . Moreover, in the segregation regime, the impact of migration on wage inequality
is partly mitigated by the fact that high-skilled locals have less children and supply more
labor.50
Finally, let us consider that the utility of low-skilled immigrants also weighs into the ranking
of the aggregated social welfare. First, it implies that there is more need of redistribution
to the now larger size of poorer population in question. Second, the eciency loss in the
process of redistribution, or the \scal leakage" eect, decreases with more weight given to
the immigrants; in fact, the leak is sealed from a central planner's point of view if she assigns
an equal weight to the utility of all resident households. Hence, the more segregated regime
will become less likely to dominate.
6 Concluding remarks
We have presented a political-economic model relating low-skilled immigration and the ed-
ucation system, where education and fertility are jointly determined. In our framework, a
49The condition is directly obtained by taking wages as endogenously determined.
50This eect is related to the quantity/quality trade-o.
41larger size of low-skilled immigration implies an expected decrease in public expenditure per
pupil on education. In such a situation, wealthier parents (i.e., high-skilled locals) prefer to
invest in their children's education out of their own pockets. As a consequence, they choose
private schooling, and consistently vote for lower tax rates to nance public education. Even-
tually, equilibria characterized by dierent degrees of segregation may arise, featuring high
private school enrollment rates and high proportions of education expenditure in the private
sector. This mechanism is strengthened by the increase in wage inequality brought about by
an increased supply of low-skilled labor.
In order to compare the theoretical predictions to empirical observations, it should be borne
in mind that our model makes the simplication that schools are funded entirely by either
public or private sources. In reality, many private schools are subsidized by the government,
while students attending public schools may still need to pay for certain fees. Therefore,
the choice of private education has to be interpreted as implying that children of wealthier
parents are more likely to attend schools with lower proportions of public funding. Moreover,
the model assumes that parents make schooling decisions for their children. This is generally
a realistic and safe assumption when the empirical investigation is restricted to students
attending primary and secondary schools.51
We have seen that the model's predictions are supported by the empirical evidence shown
in Betts and Fairlie (2003). Moreover, they conform to the stylized facts revealed in both
U.S. census data and the cross-country dataset of PISA 2003. The U.S. data documents the
highest private school enrollment and the lowest fertility rates for the high-skilled locals, and
the opposite for low-skilled immigrants. Between 1990 and 2000, it demonstrates a positive
correlation between increases in low-skilled immigration and the overall enrollment in private
schools; furthermore, it points to a widening fertility dierential among locals. Consistent
with the ordering of private school enrollment in the U.S., PISA 2003 shows that children
from high-skilled local households are more likely, on average, to attend schools with the
51This is also consistent with our interpretation of i as the investment in children's basic education.
42lowest proportion of public funding. In addition, the tabulation of low-skilled immigration
and segregation in education system is also in accordance with the positive relationship
between the two. All these phenomena can be predicted by our theoretical framework: an
increase in low-skilled immigration induces high-skilled local parents to purchase private
schooling instead of using the state system, and in so doing, they have less children so as to
compensate for the larger expenditure invested on their children's education.
It is worth remarking that these main implications do not emerge from any exogenous as-
sumption about dierences in preferences for fertility or education among immigrants and
locals, neither from any racial prejudice. The only dierences between immigrants and low-
skilled locals involve the productivity gap and thier voting rights. Both points contribute to
the impact of low-skilled immigration in terms of the likelihood and the \speed" of school
segregation, but none of them alone is crucial for the occurrence of a segregation regime.
In our model, in fact, dierent schooling choices may arise because of a suciently unequal
income-distribution, as the high-skilled parents opt out from public school when they are
suciently dissatised with the quality of public education and wealthy enough to pay out of
their own pockets for private education. Segregated regimes are hence possible also without
immigration, but a large number of low-skilled immigrants makes them more likely to occur
because the absence of voting rights (or, less strictly, the lower political power) reduces the
electoral weight of claims for redistribution, while the adjustment costs of migration widen
the income-inequality and increase congestion in public schools.52 This study is not meant
to take a position in the debate over open/closed borders; rather, it highlights the channels
through which the education system in receiving countries can be aected by low-skilled
immigration and the rational responses of local voters caring for their own children.
Our ndings give rise to a number of concerns in a dynamic perspective which are not consid-
52In other words, the no-voting rights assumption helps to sustain a segregation regime even in presence of
small income inequalities, whereas with voting rights they have to be suciently large, as, if granted voting
rights, immigrants would vote in favor of public education thus counteracting high-skilled locals' preference
for a lower tax rate. The absence of voting rights is instead crucial for the existence of a purely private regime
as shown in Section 5.2.
43ered in the present study, due to the static framework of the model. For example, it suggests
that, as low-skilled immigration intensies schooling segregation, income inequality might
become more persistent as the better-educated pupils are more likely to complete tertiary
education and acquire better jobs. Inequality may increase even further as this process con-
tinues, and the attenuated social mobility could fuel pervasive \social segregation" with an
underclass of poorly-educated families, be them locals or immigrants. Moreover, the ranking
of regimes based on aggregated local welfare can arguably be aected when eciency is con-
sidered in a dynamic perspective. As Gradstein and Justman (2001) suggest, public schools
can play an important role in promoting social integration and the cultural assimilation of
immigrants, thus paving the way for greater cohesion in society, reducing social tensions and
preventing possible obstacles to economic growth and development.53 Such medium-term
benecial functions can become less and less eective with a progressive process of segre-
gation. If these longer-run negative externalities for social cohesion were substantial, our
model suggests that tools for policy interventions might include, for instance, promoting as-
similation programs to lower the adjustment costs of immigrant workers, increasing political
participation of non-citizens at the local or the community level with regard to public educa-
tion, reducing labour-market segmentations, etc. On the whole, these issues seem to suggest
a promising direction for future research to extend our work in a dynamic framework where
the medium-to-long-run social costs can be incorporate.
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Appendix
A Data description
A.1 U.S. Census data, 1990 and 2000
Using the 1% sample U.S. census data for years 1990 and 2000 provided by the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), we construct a dataset containing students aged be-
tween 7 and 16 who were children, step children or adopted children of the head of household.
Each child was assigned to a category that describes the skill type and the immigration status
of his/her parents. There were three such categories: students with low-skilled immigrant
parents, students with low-skilled local parents, and students with high-skilled local par-
ents. The sample sizes of each category were respectively 15,394 (4.86%), 163,930 (51.78%),
48137,256 (43.36%) in 1990, and 24,300 (6.47%), 211,349 (56.27%), 139,947 (37.26%) in 2000.54
Since our model studies the relationship between low-skilled immigration and local parents'
schooling and fertility choices, we treat as missing values students with high-skilled immigrant
parents.
Parents' schooling choices are indicated by the type of school their children attend. Treat-
ing non-enrollment as missing data, students go to either public or private schools.55 The
household fertility rate is constructed taken to be the number of siblings.56 Finally, in order
to produce the scatter plots, the student data was collapsed by year and metropolitan area.
Special attention is paid to ensuring that each household is given the same weight when
computing the means of fertility for each skill group.
A.2 PISA data, 2003
PISA is an OECD program that conducts internationally standardized studies of the knowl-
edge and skills of 15-year-olds in schools. Two datasets produced in 2003 are combined for
our analysis. Data from the school questionnaire provides information on each school in
the sample, including the proportion of funding it received from each source, whether the
management was public or private, and the percentage of students who have a rst language
other than the test language used in school. Data from the student questionnaire identies
the school attended by the respondent, and details of his or her family background, includ-
ing whether the student and each parent was born in the present country of residence or
elsewhere, language spoken at home, parental occupations and educational attainment. The
combined dataset covers 35 countries in total, 24 of them OECD members.57
54See Footnote 16.
55Although in many countries, private school management does not necessarily imply private school fund-
ing, the PISA data shows that the two denitions usually coincide for U.S. schools.
56Only 0.0003% of the sample were students who report a dierent number of siblings than the number
reported by their sampled sibling(s).
57Although 41 countries participated in PISA 2003, data on some of the variables of interest was missing
for Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, there were insucient Korean students
who satised our denition of an immigrant to provide a sample.
49We identify three types of students by their immigration background and their parents' oc-
cupational status.58 With regard to parental occupational status, PISA oers two alternative
measures, both based on respondents' descriptions of their parents' main job and job func-
tions. The rst measure distinguishes four classications: white-collar high-skilled, white-
collar low-skilled, blue-collar high-skilled and blue-collar low-skilled. The second measure
maps each occupational code into the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom
et al., 1992). In order to t the occupational measure into the classication in the model, we
only counted the students with at least one white-collar high-skilled parent as having highly
skilled parents; the others were all taken as students having low-skilled parents. Alterna-
tively, students with at least one parent in an above-national-sample-median ISEI score can
be arbitrarily regarded as having highly skilled parents, and the others as having low-skilled
parents. Since the results from the two measures are more or less consistent, we report only
the statistics produced by the ISEI alternative. In the nal sample of 197,736 observations,
5.89% are identied as immigrant students with low-skilled parents, 50.77% as local students
with low-skilled parents and 43.34% as local students with high-skilled parents.
B Proofs for section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Equations (13) and (14) result from the rst order conditions of maximization. Since 
[;s]
is a sum of concave utilities and the constraint is linear in s and , the second order condition
for a maximum is satised. In order for Equation (13) to represent a tax rate, it has to satisfy
 2 [0;1]. The fact that  is non-negative is immediate. To prove it is no greater than 1,
notice that it can be decomposed into the product of two non-negative terms both no greater
58In the model, occupational skill is taken as a synonym of productivity that directly aects the earnings
of the family. Of course in reality occupational status is only a rough measure of household income, which is





1+ with  i 2 [0;1]. The comparative statics are obtained by taking
derivatives of Equation (13). 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
















For  si to be feasibly nanced via tax, we must have  si 2 [0;1=T()] such that ( si) 2 [0;1].
It is immediately seen that the upper bound is satised. Moreover, since T()  0, it is






> 0; 8 s 2 [0;1=T(:)]; (20)
which shows that i is monotonically increasing for all feasible s. Thus,  si is unique. Equa-
tion (20) also implies that i > 0 i s >  si, which proves Point 2. Moreover  si is positive
and increasing in wi, which proves Point 3. Point 4 follows from the denition of i, and
from Points 2 and 3. The reverse direction of the nal part of Point 4 comes from Lemma 2
which states that, if  L =  H = 0,  = 0 and consequently s = 0. 
C Proofs for section 5.1
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the public regime, every child attends a public school of high quality: s >  sH (i.e. nobody
opts out). By replacing  H =  L =  M = 1 in (14) and in (19), the inequality representing
51no opting out can be recast into the condition: C < .
In the partial segregation regime, some highly skilled parents opt out of public schooling,
while the rest attend public schools with quality s =  sH. Replacing  L =  M = 1 in
Equations (14) and (19) and dening the function 	H( H)  (s    sH), it can easily be
veried that 	H() is composed of a strictly positive part times a concave second-order
polynomial. Hence, the stable solution to 	H() = 0 must be identied by the larger root of
the polynomial.59 This root must satisfy  H 2 [0;1] for the partial segregation regime to be
a stable equilibrium. By recasting this constraint, the condition B    C is then obtained.
In the segregation regime, all the highly skilled parents opt out of public schools, whereas
every child with low-skilled parents continue to receive public education with quality s 2
] sL;  sH[. By replacing  H = 0 and  L =  M = 1 in Equations (14) and (19), the constraint
on school quality can be recast into the condition: A <  < B.
In the private regime, no child attends public schools, and the expenditure on public schools
satises s   sL. By setting  i = 0; 8i in Equation (14), we obtain s = 0 <  sL, which
indicates that a private regime may emerge at any positive level of . 
C.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Set  H = 0 and  M = 1 in Equations (14) and (19) and then dene the function 	L( L) 
(s    sL). Using the same procedure for deriving the condition of the partial segregation
regime, 	L() can be rewritten as a product of a strictly positive factor and a concave
second-order polynomial. This implies that, if there are two distinct roots, the smaller one
(denoted by  L0
) is unstable while the larger (denoted by  L) is stable. In order for the
latter to represent an education regime it must be admissible, i.e., it must locate within [0;1],
59Intuitively, since public school congestion is relieved with some pupils opting out, there is a threshold  H
beyond which the quality of public school is no worse than  sH, so that there is no further ight into private
education. Denoting  H as the stable root and  H
0
as the unstable one, we have 	H() = (s    sH) >
0; 8 H 2] H
0
; H[.
52the domain of  L.
Next, it can be proven that the polynomial associated with  L() is negative when evaluated
at 0. Hence, if there is an admissible stable equilibrium, there must also exist an admissible
unstable equilibrium, i.e., 0 <  L0 <  L  1. It can be proven by contradiction, however,
that this is never the case. In fact, the only admissible equilibrium is represented by the
unstable smaller root, and its existence requires that the polynomial is non-negative when
evaluated at 1. This condition yields the following inequality:   A, where A is at the same
time the lower bound of the segregation regime. Therefore, we conclude that, as long as the
segregation regime exists (A <  < B), an equilibrium also exists with all high-skilled and
some low-skilled locals opting out of public schools, but this equilibrium is not stable and
thus fails to qualify as an education regime. 
53Figure 3: The relationship between changes in the proportion of students with low-skilled immigrant parents

























































































−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
Change in the proportion of students
with low−skilled immigrant parents, 1990−2000
Data source:  IPUMS.
Circle areas and weights proportional to the amount of immigrant students in the area.
Correlation (p-value): 0:3707 (:0001).
Hollow circles are proportional to the number of students with low-skilled immigrant parents in each area in
2000. The correlation is weighted by these numbers.
54Figure 4: The relationship between changes in the fertility dierential and changes in the private school

































































































−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Change in the fertility differential
among locals, 1990−2000
Data source:  IPUMS.
Circle areas and weights proportional to the amount of immigrant students in the area.
Correlation (p-value): 0:2096 (:0327).
Hollow circles are proportional to the number of students with low-skilled immigrant parents in each area in
2000. The correlation is weighted by these numbers.
55Figure 5: The distribution of countries by regime
(a) All countries
(b) Countries in the public and the segregation regimes
The variation in the proportion of public funding for schools is dened as Smax Smin
Smax , where Smax and Smin
are respectively the maximum and minimum of the average proportion for all three types of students.
A hollow circle around a dot indicates that immigrant students with low-skilled parents do not have the
highest average proportion of public funding for schools. A hollow square indicates that local students with
high-skilled parents do not have the lowest average proportion of public funding for schools .
56Table 1: Private school enrollment rate by type of parent
Parent Type Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
low-skilled 39694 .0574646 .0011681 .2327311 .055175 .0597542
immigrants
low-skilled 375279 .0749283 .0004298 .2632759 .0740859 .0757706
locals
high-skilled 277203 .1402294 .0005595 .3472255 .1389368 .141522
locals
di = mean(low-skilled immigrants) - mean(low-skilled locals) t = -14.0306
Ho: di = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 51066.8
Ha: di < 0 Ha: di 6= 0 Ha: di > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
di = mean(low-skilled locals) - mean(high-skilled locals) t = -82.9568
Ho: di = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 496490
Ha: di < 0 Ha: di 6= 0 Ha: di > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
Table 2: Fertility rate by type of parent
Parent Type Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
low-skilled 39694 3.198594 .0077865 1.551325 3.183333 3.213856
immigrants
low-skilled 375279 2.664394 .002123 1.300551 2.660233 2.668555
locals
high-skilled 277203 2.472527 .0020421 1.075164 2.468525 2.47653
locals
di = mean(low-skilled immigrants) - mean(low-skilled locals) t = 67.2521
Ho: di = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 47300.6
Ha: di < 0 Ha: di 6= 0 Ha: di > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
di = mean(low-skilled locals) - mean(high-skilled locals) t = 65.1339
Ho: di = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 644288
Ha: di < 0 Ha: di 6= 0 Ha: di > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
57Table 3: Average proportion of public funding for schools, by student type






Public Czech Republic 95.947868 94.455482 94.491226
(1.49884) (0.75120) (0.95114)
Finland 99.705894 99.859612 99.76329
(0.21604) (0.06989) (0.12451)
Hong Kong, China 90.362579 90.300293 89.101669
(0.71049) (0.76235) (1.03829)
Hungary 89.461647 90.797348 91.828087
(1.74355) (0.96053) (1.04546)
Iceland 99.951324 99.82151 99.497459
(0.04844) (0.04090) (0.10513)
Latvia 97.44603 96.811264 95.309799
(0.84557) (0.53616) (1.32920)
Luxembourg 98.262581 97.684868 97.727051
(0.15186) (0.17642) (0.14725)
Netherlands 95.499214 95.30101 95.734619
(0.78485) (0.72313) (0.52036)
Norway 99.6166 99.696068 99.591499
(0.26743) (0.20762) (0.26739)
Poland 95 97.005188 94.845886
(0.00000) (0.43540) (0.79274)
Russian Federation 92.18248 92.281113 91.347771
(1.54375) (1.10452) (1.39742)
Serbia and Montenegro 92.439629 93.723763 93.995689
(1.25150) (0.87957) (0.63648)
Slovak Republic 93.032448 91.837425 93.303055
(2.64327) (0.90203) (0.76817)
Sweden 99.468834 99.914383 99.75779
(0.29455) (0.03420) (0.13790)
Segregation Belgium 92.970215 89.557091 86.785774
58Regime (1.09799) (0.91271) (1.13165)
Canada 93.834282 92.389626 89.493698
(0.73521) (0.51115) (0.84146)
Denmark 96.998848 92.920151 92.788795
(1.18401) (0.88155) (1.29765)
Germany 97.919785 96.71534 94.55452
(0.49344) (0.50523) (0.77876)
Greece 91.242668 89.450066 85.663513
(1.30087) (1.27673) (3.58973)
Ireland 95.617073 95.129005 90.606308
(1.04415) (0.50559) (1.41699)
Japan 72.268036 76.384232 70.925522
(8.43649) (1.41331) (1.91171)
Liechtenstein 99.966019 95.998367 94.248375
(0.01923) (0.86398) (1.07504)
New Zealand 77.494125 80.100792 76.031754
(1.25158) (0.86149) (1.14851)
Portugal 86.659126 85.87606 81.260452
(3.08535) (1.65654) (2.58895)
Switzerland 98.901016 96.968895 92.92453
(0.33304) (0.48104) (1.36581)
United States 92.208778 88.422775 85.61586
(1.82975) (1.76358) (2.41584)
Severely Australia 73.738464 76.311218 65.669144
Segregated (1.22751) (0.91294) (1.29929)
Brazil 98.669655 88.048607 65.418968
(0.84375) (1.45130) (4.23931)
Thailand 100.000000 87.511017 76.087975
(0.00002) (1.55778) (1.99347)
Tunisia 66.404343 68.561096 75.390099
(7.35852) (1.64594) (1.03259)
Uruguay 86.23951 88.014587 66.863541
(5.97201) (1.15223) (2.19179)
59Private Indonesia 21.599062 33.002502 33.966629
Regime (9.97910) (2.08754) (2.65803)
Macao, China 53.021244 45.711414 38.762604
(0.83486) (2.45105) (1.69494)
Mexico 42.020725 42.115124 34.941616
(8.07494) (3.40941) (2.74917)
Turkey 47.327709 57.608212 51.505253
(9.59675) (2.55671) (3.47479)
The associated stand errors on the mean are included in the parentheses.
60Table 4: Low-skilled immigration and education regime
Low-skilled immigrants as those with less than secondary education
Regime Change in average stock Average stock ratio (in proportion Change in average stock ratio
1990-2000 to the total population) in 2000 1990-2000
Public -39784.49 1.98% -0.06%
(8 countries) (79846.49) (1.69%) (0.41%)
Segregation 383054.60 3.16% 0.43%
(12 countries) (978392.40) (2.21%) (0.38%)
Low-skilled immigrants as those with less than tertiary education
Regime Change in average stock Average stock ratio (in proportion Change in average stock ratio
1990-2000 to the total population) in 2000 1990-2000
Public 2664.21 3.90% 0.57%
(8 countries) (109170.20) (2.83%) (0.78%)
Segregation 564021.90 5.22% 0.77%
(12 countries) (1470442.00) (3.50%) (0.78%)
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